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Abstract
This article examines the policy detail of welfare state reform agendas in two countries
in which self-proclaimed ‘Third Way’ governments have been in power – Germany and the
United Kingdom – in order to explore the competing influences on social policy of an ostensibly
common set of ideas and contrasting institutionalised policy legacies. In so doing, it assesses
the analytic utility of Bevir and Rhodes’ ideationally rooted interpretive approach against
institutionally rooted claims of path dependency. It concludes that while the interpretive
approach rightly stresses the need for a stronger focus on ideas as an explanation for policy
change, the detail of actual Third Way policy reforms can only be understood from within
the two nations’ institutionalised policy legacies. In addition, it argues that policy networks
have had a considerable influence on reform trajectories too. The article advocates a closer
synthesis of perspectives centred around ideas, interests and institutions in order to further our
understanding of processes of policy change.
Introduction
Giddens (2001) claimed that the turn of the century coincided with a global Third
Way debate about the modernisation of social democracy. There is much that he
can legitimately point to in order to support this claim, including numerous high-
level seminars in which centre-left political leaders from around the world met to
forge a new ‘progressive governance’ agenda and an outpouring of academic work
too. While documenting Third Way reform processes across the globe has itself
proved a useful task – and a number of excellent studies have focused on recording
this moment in the history of social democratic politics (for example, Bonoli and
Powell, 2004; Lewis and Surrender, 2004) – the cross-national examination of
ostensibly common Third Way reform agendas also offers us a rare opportunity
for exploring the interplay between common cross-national policy ideas and
varying national policy contexts. The policy analysis literature has shown an
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increasing concern with the role of ideas in explaining policy change, but Be´land
(2005: 14) notes that studies in the sphere have been hampered by the fact that
‘“smoking guns” are uncommon in ideational analysis’. Comparative analysis of
shared Third Way reform agendas has the potential to offer us such a weapon.
It would be wrong to suggest there has been unqualified agreement as to what
the Third Way means or, even, whether it should fall under a ‘Third Way’ label, and
much of the academic debate has focused on uncovering cross-national variations
in the broad principles underpinning the ‘Third Way’ (for example, Bonoli and
Powell, 2002, 2004). However, Schro¨ter (2004: 2) argues that the movement
produced an ostensibly unprecedented degree of unity among social democratic
parties. Moreover, Giddens (2001: 1) has urged us not to lose our way in a semantic
debate, arguing that the often-abstract terminological debate has distracted from
cross-national commonalities at the programmatic level. In part to test Giddens’
assertion, we wish to move beyond the examination of broad ideas here and
instead explore the policy detail of actual welfare state reform. In so doing, of
course, we expect to find differences between nations because, as is commonly
argued, ‘there is unlikely to be a uniform Third Way given . . . different histories,
polities, and economies’ (Bonoli and Powell, 2002: 62; cf. Green-Pedersen et al.,
2001: 308). Yet those comparing Third Way governments have mainly looked to
identify commonalities between reform processes (for example, Green-Pedersen
and van Kersbergen, 2002; Green-Pedersen et al., 2001) or to trace the transfer
of specific policy ideas between nations (for example, Larsen, 2002; Peck and
Theodore, 2001) rather than demonstrating how differing cultural, political and
historical forces push Third Way reform trajectories apart in practice.
Here we examine welfare state reform trajectories in two institutionally
contrasting countries that were not only among the first to elect Third Way
governments but were also among the smaller band of nations to re-elect them
beyond a first term in office: the United Kingdom (UK), where Blair’s New Labour
took office in 1997 (and won two subsequent general elections in 2001 and 2005,
with Blair departing as leader in 2007) and Germany, where Schro¨der’s Social
Democratic Party (SPD) came to power in 1998 in coalition with Alliance 90/The
Greens and won re-election in 2002 (on origins see Bonoli and Powell, 2002;
Merkel, 2000). In so doing, we look to offer a contribution to the debate about
the competing roles played by institutional and ideational forces in shaping policy
change. Our article will proceed as follows. After briefly reviewing key theoretical
arguments about the role of ideas and institutions in shaping policy change, we
outline competing hypotheses concerning the likely direction of policy change.
We then move on to consider policy reform processes in three sectors of the
welfare state – pensions, employment and health – in each country and, through
consideration of actual policy change, try to ascertain the varying influences
of ideas and institutions on these reform processes. Finally, we offer some
thoughts on how theory in this field might be bolstered by viewing ideational and
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institutional perspectives as complementary rather than competing perspectives.
We also suggest that they might be fruitfully combined with explanations rooted
in interest group-based analyses of policy change.
Ideational analysis: the Third Way/Neue Mitte narrative
In comparing Germany and the UK we hope largely to sidestep the thorny issue of
how to define the Third Way because Blair and Schro¨der issued a jointly authored
manifesto on the Third Way/Neue Mitte that we will use for this purpose (Blair
and Schro¨der, 1999). While they argued in their statement that ‘we are presenting
our ideas as an outline, not a finalised programme’, at around 5,000 words in
length and with principles, broad policy aims and specific flagship initiatives
contained within it, the statement gives us plenty to work from. Indeed, the
document is an excellent statement of their aspirations for an international
Third Way movement that was written when the recent revival of European
social democratic parties was at its peak.
How we might best analyse this statement of intent is open to debate. The
recent ‘ideational turn’ in policy analysis has been marked by a distinct lack of
consensus over the tools, techniques and concepts that ought to underpin an
ideational approach (see Hay, 2002; Finlayson, 2004; Taylor-Gooby, 2005). For
the most part, theorists have built on Hall’s (1993) notion of ‘social learning’
or Kingdon’s (1995) work on agendas and alternatives (see Greener, 2002 and
Be´land, 2005, respectively). However, the most radical entry into the debate is
arguably that of Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2004a, 2004b), whose ‘interpretive
approach’ challenges many of the core assumptions of existing policy analysis
frameworks. At its heart is the claim that ‘to recover the beliefs that inform actions
is to provide a causal explanation of those actions’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2004b:
159). Indeed, they reject structural explanations of political action, arguing it is
impossible to predict the desires, actions or beliefs of people from information
about their social or institutional location. Instead, they focus on ‘unpacking
[actors’] constituent ideas and locating them in traditions and dilemmas’ (ibid.).
Methodologically, this demands we ‘read practices, actions, texts, interviews
and speeches to recover other people’s stories’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2004b: 159)
and, because these narratives need to be grounded in a consideration of deep-
rooted beliefs in order for us to understand them, it demands ‘a historical form
of inquiry: we have to locate their stories within their wider webs of belief, and
these webs of belief against the background of traditions they modify in response
to specific dilemmas’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2004a: 135). In other words, action
emanates from ideas and change occurs when established traditions are modified
in light of new dilemmas that challenge the validity of these traditions. At the
core of their approach, therefore, is not only an emphasis on ideas as the driving
force for political action, but also a privileging of actors’ own accounts rather
than those of academics or ‘expert’ commentators.
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TABLE 1. Unpacking the Blair–Schro¨der Narrative
Blair–Schro¨der
theme
Perceived Social
Democratic
tradition(s) Perceived dilemma(s) Third Way response(s)
1 Learning from
experience
Large state sector Underplayed negative
impact of social
spending;
Focus on how money is
spent not how much
Overestimated
capacity of state to
micro-manage
economy
2 Changed realities Strongly
decommodified
labour
Rigid labour markets
unable to adapt to
increasingly rapid
pace of economic
change
More flexible labour
markets;
Investment in human
capital rather than
social protection
High levels of
taxation to fund
social
programmes
Economic
globalisation
creates pressure for
low-cost business
environment
Reform public services
to guarantee value for
money;
Reduce size of
bureaucracy – steer
rather than row
3 Supply-side agenda
for the Left
Keynesian demand
management
Increased risk of
unemployment in
face of global
economic
competition
Reduce non-wage costs
for employers;
Make work pay for
employees;
More flexible labour
markets
Increased risk of
capital flight in
globalised economy
Reform (reduce)
business taxes
Though by no means without its critics (see Finlayson, 2004), Bevir and
Rhodes’ approach offers a useful basis from which to analyse the impact of
the Third Way agenda, for Blair and Schro¨der (1999) themselves claimed that the
Third Way is a ‘modernisation’ of traditional social democratic values in response
to ‘conditions that have objectively changed’, particularly the emergence of a more
globalised, knowledge-based and technologically driven economy. As such, Blair
and Schro¨der offer us an easy route to unpacking their narrative in terms of
the core elements of the Bevir and Rhodes approach: tradition, dilemma and
response. The key elements of their narrative can be summarised under three
headings (see Table 1 for an overview). Firstly, there is – as Blair and Schro¨der
put it – the process of ‘learning from experience’, by which they mean the need
for the Third Way to depart from traditional social democracy in areas where
the latter was deemed to have failed in the past. The chief issues here surround
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the perceived negative impacts of a large state sector and the key policy lesson
they draw seems to be that ‘social conscience cannot be measured by the level of
public expenditure [. . .what matters] is how effectively this expenditure is used’.
Secondly, they see a need to adapt social democratic values to accommodate the
‘changed realities’ of the ‘newly emerging world’. Here they stress the need for
flexibility ‘in a world of ever more rapid globalisation and scientific changes’
and the need ‘to invest in human capital: to make the individual and businesses
fit for the knowledge-based economy of the future’. Finally, there is the need to
develop a new ‘supply side agenda for the left’ in order to meet key social and
economic policy challenges. Here the message is clear: traditional Keynesianism
is no longer an option so ‘economies must be adaptable: flexible markets are a
modern social democratic aim’.
Bevir and Rhodes believe one of the main strengths of their approach is that it
‘does not read off actions from allegedly objective social facts about institutions
or people’ offering, instead, ‘an analysis of change rooted in the beliefs and
preferences of individual actors’ (2003: 195–9). This is a significant claim for most
typologies of welfare state institutions place Germany and the UK in different
camps, sometimes as polar opposites. If the common Third Way narrative can
convincingly explain change without reference to these differing contexts that
will be some feat, given what are widely perceived to be quite different social
policy legacies in the two nations.
Differing national contexts: institutionalised policy legacies
Despite their acknowledged imperfections, welfare typologies usefully tease out
some of the historically dominant features of our two nations’ institutionalised
policy legacies. From a historical institutionalist perspective, these long-run
historical policy legacies ought to be largely self-reinforcing; as Pierson argues,
‘social actors make commitments based on existing institutions and policies [and]
as they do so, the cost of reversing course generally rises dramatically’ (2004: 35).
Ultimately, therefore, institutions ‘induce self-reinforcing processes that make
reversals increasingly unattractive over time’ (ibid.). In short, institutionalists
would expect policy change to be ‘path dependent’, reflecting the differing
institutional legacies in our two countries.
The dominant categorisation of national welfare ‘paths’ is undoubtedly
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three-way classification of welfare regimes. According
to his classic typology, the UK is part of the liberal world of welfare in which
means-tested benefits predominate, social interventions are designed primarily
to act as a safety net and private provision is encouraged. Germany is the ideal
type of the conservative/corporatist regime in which social rights are strong but
attached to status, so earnings-related social insurance benefits predominate.
These regimes, according to Esping-Andersen, are the outcome of a long process
of development and represent distinct paths. Though widely accepted as a useful
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typology, one of the weaknesses of Esping-Andersen’s approach is that it is built on
data relating only to pensions, unemployment insurance and sickness insurance.
While the description of policy regimes fits well with the UK and Germany’s
pensions systems, it is of little use in helping us to understand changes in the
other policy sectors we want to examine here – health and employment – so we
need to look to alternative typologies for these sectors.
In terms of employment policy, the growing debate about cross-national
differences in economic institutions offers us a useful alternative. Hall and
Soskice (2001) have argued that the UK and Germany are examples of different
‘varieties of capitalism’, the UK having a ‘liberal market economy’ (LME) where
economic co-ordination takes place primarily through market mechanisms, while
Germany has a ‘co-ordinated market economy’ (CME) in which non-market
modes of co-ordination are prominent. They argue that complementary national
institutions – including supportive social policies – underpin these differing
forms of economic co-ordination. More specifically, Estevez-Abe et al. (2001)
argue that different welfare production regimes, featuring contrasting levels of
employment, unemployment and wage protection, map on to each: in LMEs
these protection policies are weak (with free labour markets being favoured)
when compared to CMEs (where co-ordinated intervention in labour markets is
more readily tolerated). Health has always been something of an exception in the
UK model (as Esping-Andersen concedes), acting as a social democratic oasis
in a largely liberal welfare regime. The classic distinction between Beveridgian
and Bismarckian welfare models – the former being characterised by (universal)
flat-rate social protection funded through general taxation and the latter by
earnings-related social protection funded through individual (and employer)
contributions to social insurance funds – offers a useful way forward in this sector
(Pierson, 1998: 778). As the progenitors of these labels, the British and German
cases are contrasting ideal types and the two nations’ health care systems fit neatly
into these categorisations.
Historical institutionalists suggest that these differing policy paths are
amplified over time due to policy feedback that makes it easier and more fruitful
to continue down the existing policy path rather than switch to an alternative
(see Table 2 for a summary of these paths). They also claim that these differing
policy arrangements fundamentally impact on the nature of key political debates
about future policy change because they heavily influence actors’ interests. Given
this, the institutionally grounded policy legacies thesis provides a strong counter
to the ideational hypothesis that expects the common Third Way agenda to
produce a similar set of policy outcomes in our two countries. Instead, the
institutionalist perspective suggests that long-run path dependencies ought to
manifest themselves in the nations’ policy agendas: in pensions, employment
and health policy we ought to see the differing liberal/conservative, LME/CME
and Beveridge/Bismarck legacies (respectively) remain intact. Significantly, Bevir
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TABLE 2. Institutionalised policy legacies
Typology Dimension Germany United Kingdom
Welfare regimes (Pensions) Decommodification
(i.e. social rights)
Strong Weak
Stratification Weak (maintains
existing hierarchies)
Weak (social policy
as safety net)
State–market nexus Para-statal provision
common; purely
private provisions
crowded out
Private provision
encouraged;
state–market
duality
Welfare production
regimes (Employment)
Employment
protection
Strong Weak
Unemployment
benefits
Generous Minimal
Wage protection Negotiated,
corporatist
Market determines
pay
Bismarck–Beveridge
(Health)
Funding mechanism Social insurance General taxation
Level of provision Entitlement-based Universal
Organisation Corporatist,
parastatal;
decentralised
State-based;
centralised
and Rhodes see the institutionalist approach not just as a counter-thesis but,
rather, as the antithesis of the interpretive approach, which, they argue, ‘replaces
unhelpful phrases such as path-dependency with an analysis of change rooted in
the beliefs and preferences of individual actors’ (2003: 199). We will now offer
a brief overview of the detail of Blair and Schro¨ders’ reforms in employment,
pensions and health care, first sketching the broad trajectories of their reform
processes in these sectors and then moving on to an examination of the interplay
between institutional and ideational ‘forces’ in shaping these trajectories.
The Third Way in action? Examining policy reform trajectories
Given the emphasis on pursuing a new supply-side agenda in the Blair–Schro¨der
communique´, it is unsurprising that new employment policies were at the heart
of welfare reforms in both countries. In the UK, the Blair government outlined a
‘new contract for welfare’ in its first year in office, the key principle of which was
‘work for those who can and security for those who cannot’ (Blair, 1998: iii). A
series of ‘New Deals’ was introduced for key target groups, each designed to assist
job search activities, provide relevant training and, for the young or long-term
unemployed, subsidise employers providing jobs for programme participants
(see HM Treasury/Department of Work and Pensions, 2003). After a relatively
modest approach in his first term of office, Schro¨der, as part of his ‘Agenda
2010’ programme, implemented a radical set of employment policy reforms
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in his second term. For the most part, these built on the report of the Hartz
Commission (Hartz, 2002), whose proposals Schro¨der committed himself to fully
implementing (Schro¨der, 2003). The most controversial component of these acts
was the merger of unemployment assistance and social assistance together with
stricter rules of acceptability for suitable jobs offered by placement officers.
In short, there are strong commonalities between the two countries in
terms of placing active labour market policies (ALMPs) at the heart of their
unemployment benefits systems. There are, however, some important differences
to be found too. In the UK, on top of the refocusing of unemployment
benefits, there has also been a concerted effort to ‘make work pay’ (see HM
Treasury/Department of Work and Pensions, 2003) through a range of ‘tax credits’
designed to boost the income of those in low-paid jobs or whose circumstances
might lead to them being worse off in work than on benefits. These targeted
income top-ups were a central plank of the Blair government’s social policies
and had no genuine parallel in the German programme. They represent a
considerable increase in public expenditure in this sphere and can be contrasted
with the Schro¨der government’s attempt to restrict expenditure by merging
unemployment insurance and social assistance. Further still, it is worth noting
that in Germany there was a (modest) loosening of other employment protection
policies that made it easier for businesses to dismiss employees, while in the UK
there have been some important – though again modest – improvements in
employment rights, including the introduction of a national minimum wage in
April 1999 and endorsement of the European Social Chapter, which the preceding
Major government had opted out of.
Central to the common agenda outlined by Blair and Schro¨der was an
emphasis on keeping taxation and spending within tight limits and reducing
non-wage costs to businesses. As the largest single public spending commitments
faced by both countries it is unsurprising that pensions have provided a focal
point for reform. Indeed, in his exploration of the global Third Way debate,
Giddens asserted that ‘in at least some of its aspects, and in some countries, the
welfare state has become unsustainable . . . the pension commitments of some
countries, such as Germany . . . are completely unrealizable’ (2001: 103), while
Blair and Schro¨der’s joint statement argued ‘social security systems need to adapt
to changes in life expectancy’.
Pension reforms in the UK and Germany showed a remarkable commonality
of purpose. In the UK, the Blair government stated its intentions early in its
first term of office to increase the proportion of pensioner income coming
from private pensions from 40 per cent to 60 per cent by 2050, reversing the
existing situation (Department of Social Security, 1998). In order to achieve this,
a complex mix of provision has been put in place (see Hills, 2004). While the
state has long encouraged the uptake of private pensions by offering generous
tax relief on contributions, a number of measures have been introduced to
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stimulate further take-up, including the creation of a new ‘stakeholder pension’
targeted at those on modest incomes, tougher regulation of funds and greater
protection in instances where funds collapse. While the universal, flat-rate basic
state pension is to be protected, its value will diminish as earnings rise, although
a tentative reform proposal outlined in 2006 may restore the link with earnings
in exchange for raising the age at which it is paid (Department of Work and
Pensions, 2006). In order to protect those with no or little private provision, a
new means-tested ‘minimum income guarantee’ was introduced in 1999, replaced
by a more generous ‘pension credit’ in 2003. In Germany, meanwhile, the pension
reforms of 2001 fixed the state’s contributions to standard pension insurance at
an upper limit of 20 per cent alongside the introduction of a new formula
for calculating payments that will have the net effect of reducing replacement
rates from these schemes (see Hinrichs, 2003; Schmidt, 2003). In addition, the
reforms also introduced a new voluntary private pensions savings scheme with
tax-subsidised contributions and a new means-tested basic security scheme for
low-income pensioners. In both countries, the core goals are clear: to limit the
percentage of each individual’s pension costs for which the state is responsible,
to increase the role of private provision and increasingly to focus additional state
support on the poorest pensioners via a means-tested safety net.
While less explicit in their comments on health care per se, Blair and
Schro¨der’s joint statement certainly spoke to a number of major themes of
great importance to policy in this sphere. As the most expensive public service
(as opposed to cash transfer) in each country, the leaders’ claims that ‘public
expenditure as a proportion of national income has more or less reached the
limits of acceptability’ and that ‘constraints on “tax and spend” force radical
modernisation of the public reform of public services to achieve better value for
money’ were clearly of direct relevance to this sector. So too were their arguments
that ‘public sector bureaucracy at all levels must be reduced, performance targets
and objectives formulated, the quality of public services rigorously monitored,
and bad performance rooted out’ and that ‘the state should not row, but
steer’.
In Germany, there was a very clear attempt to contain the costs of health care
spending. The first draft for the Reform Act of Social Health Insurance released in
1999 included the ambitious plan to introduce tightly controlled global budgets
by assigning an upper limit for total health care expenditure. While these initial
proposals were abandoned due to vehement resistance (Hartmann, 2003), the
red–green coalition eventually succeeded in shifting costs to patients via increased
charges, including an ‘entry fee’ for visits to a doctor’s surgery in the 2004 Health
Care Reform. This shifting of costs to patients marked a significant u-turn for
the Schro¨der government: in 1998 it had reversed charges introduced by the Kohl
administration. By way of contrast, however, in the UK there was a considerable
injection of additional funding into the National Health Service (NHS) during
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Blair’s tenure, and a particularly marked growth after 2002 when he pledged to
take UK spending on health care as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) above the European Union (EU) average after decades lagging behind
it. So, with respect to health care spending plans, there is a strongly divergent
pattern of policy change.
There was more common ground between the countries in terms of reforms
designed to boost the efficiency of health care services, but again the overall
picture differs in terms of the organisational structures introduced to this end.
Less than a year into office, Blair’s government ‘proposed major changes in the
structure, organization and funding of the NHS’ (Glendinning, 2003: 199; see
Department of Health, 1997). On the face of it – and certainly this is the view
presented in government rhetoric – the reform involved a considerable devolution
of power from the centre to the front line. Further devolution of control was
created by controversial reforms that introduced ‘foundation hospitals’, elite
institutions allowed to ‘opt out’ of the traditional NHS structure and become
independent not-for-profit organisations with greater autonomy. Alongside all
this devolution, however, there has also been an increase in the monitoring
of activity and a frenzied setting of strategic objectives by the centre, with
new institutions formed to ensure targets are being monitored and met and to
specify best-value treatments and procedures. By way of contrast, the structural
reforms of the Schro¨der governments appear to be rather modest (see Hartmann,
2003). Their 2000 reform introduced stricter monitoring of hospital activity and
greater specification of acceptable activity. Among the changes were binding
evidence-based guidelines on preferred treatments, guidelines on technology
assessment and the nationwide implementation of payment based on diagnostic-
related groups (DRGs). Nevertheless, the overall institutional structure of the
system remained intact. To summarise, while there was a clear shared goal of
increasing the efficiency of health care services, widely differing strategies were
adopted. Though both governments increased monitoring of medical activity,
clear divergence can be seen with respect to structural reforms, the UK devolving
power and Germany avoiding deep structural reforms of this type.
A Third Way in action? Assessing the interpretive approach
Whether these tales of reform endorse the interpretive or the institutional thesis
depends to a large degree on whether they describe a tale of policy convergence
or policy divergence respectively (see Table 3 for a summary). Determining
which of these terms best describes the process of change is, however, far from
straightforward. As we note above, in pensions policy the reform agenda shared
a great deal in terms of its broad detail. Similarly, the core employment policies
centred on introducing ALMP and much of the story in the health care field
was one of scrutinising (and micro-managing) more intensely than before the
effectiveness of spending. At the same time, however, there are areas in which
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TABLE 3. Policy reform trajectories
Germany United Kingdom
Employment Active labour market policy
Employment rights
Employment protection
Pensions State’s contributions
Private provision
Means-tested safety net
Health State’s contribution
Monitoring and control
Decentralisation of Structures
= Increase = Decrease = No Change
there seemed to be different reform pathways: in employment policy, the UK
strengthened employment rights while Germany weakened them and the UK’s
tax credits had no real parallel in Germany. In health care policy, meanwhile,
the differences were more notable still: the UK sanctioning huge increases in
health care spending and experimenting with some potentially radical new
organisational forms while in Germany the picture was largely one of institutional
stasis and cost reduction. In short, there seems to be something of a mixed picture
on the convergence/divergence question.
Yet we might reasonably ask whether convergence is best understood as a
process of common means or common ends. For instance, in terms of employ-
ment rights, while the Blair governments looked to strengthen them and
Schro¨der’s weaken them, in both cases we observe modest changes and, ultimately,
these rights remain much stronger in Germany than in the UK. However, these
seemingly divergent reform trajectories pushed the two countries a little closer
together in this policy sphere. (Between 1998 and 2003, Germany and the UK
moved closer together in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development’s (OECD) Employment Policy Legislation strictness index, but with
Germany remaining above, and the UK some way below, the OECD average –
see OECD, 2006.) Similarly, the diverging trends with respect to health care
spending will have much the same effect: Germany has long spent more than the
EU average on health care and Blair’s aim to take public spending on health to
8.2 per cent of GDP by 2008 will place it at a level remarkably similar to the rate
in Germany when Blair came to power in 1997. Likewise, while Blair’s plans to
create foundation hospitals hold the potential to alter radically the structure of
the NHS, in boosting the role of semi-independent (para-statal) organisations,
they mimic one of the key features of the German model. In other words, it might
well be argued that divergent means have had the effect of producing converging
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ends in these particular areas of policy: that a process of ‘condivergence’ has
occurred.
All this, perhaps, offers considerable ammunition for the ideational thesis,
but only if the agenda can be understood in terms of the Third Way narrative
and the traditions and dilemmas in which it is rooted. Significantly, it is easy
to explain much of the agenda in this way. Of the common policy elements,
boosting the flexibility of labour markets to account for global economic change,
the stronger focus on the way money is spent in health care services in order to
reflect a concern with value for money and the desire to limit the growth of public
expenditure in the field of pensions in order to keep overall taxation rates down –
all fit neatly into the broad thrust of the Third Way narrative. Likewise, many
of the ‘condivergent’ elements can be accounted for in a similar fashion. While,
taken at face value, the two nations’ employment protection policies are heading
in different directions, both are clearly framed by a Third Way compromise
between a desire to protect social rights while also promoting flexible labour
markets. Blair’s approach was generally modest in intent – signalled, above all,
by his refusal to fully sign up to the EU’s directive limiting working hours – while
Schro¨der’s entailed incremental removal of some of the longstanding rigidities in
the German labour market while protecting many of its key features, including
the EU directive on working hours. Similarly, Schro¨der’s attempts to constrain
the cost of health care clearly chime with the Third Way belief that public sector
spending has more or less reached its limits and the absence of deeper reforms
to the structure of the service might be argued as irrelevant in the context. By
contrast, while Blair’s huge injection of additional cash into the sector seemed to
go somewhat against the grain of the Third Way narrative, his desire to reconcile
this spending growth with the Third Way narrative might well explain why
he insisted on pushing through largely unpopular reforms aimed at boosting
competition and, indeed, reducing the size of public bureaucracy to accompany
this.
There is, then, much to commend the interpretive approach: not only is
there a large degree of commonality in the policy agenda being pursued in the
two countries, its direction is largely consistent with the Third Way narrative
and, furthermore, discordant policy paths can be explained in a manner largely
consistent with the narrative. Yet while the focus on ideas and beliefs that Bevir
and Rhodes advocate can usefully help us interpret the ideational roots of change,
it is much less useful in helping us understand what form change might take;
the shared ideational agenda we see here manifests itself in often diverse forms.
Indeed, while Bevir and Rhodes forcefully assert that we cannot ‘read off actions’
from institutions, it seems equally true that policy ideas cannot be read straight
from beliefs without some understanding of the mediating variables that can
lead to strong variations of the same theme as in our cases. Might the varying
institutionalised policy legacies be the key?
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Path-dependent or path-breaking Third Ways? Assessing the
institutional approach
The (historical) institutionalist perspective encourages us to take a step back
from the immediate point of decision and consider the long dure´e for the simple
reason that a ‘focus on path-dependent processes suggests the need to develop
analyses that may incorporate substantial stretches of time’ (Pierson, 2004: 45).
What matters most from this perspective, it might be argued, is not so much
whether common ideas can be identified across nations but, rather, whether
national reform programmes display strong continuity with preceding policy
frameworks. In short, what matters is whether change is path breaking or path
confirming.
However, as with distinguishing between convergent and divergent policy
change, determining whether a reform agenda is path breaking or confirming
is a far from straightforward task and one that has been muddied by crude
conceptions of path dependency as the claim that policy does not change or
is ‘frozen’ (including Rhodes, 2004). Given this, Pierson carefully stresses that
‘path dependence refers to dynamic processes involving positive feedback, which
generates multiple possible outcomes depending on the particular sequence in
which events unfold’ and, consequently, it refers to ‘social processes that exhibit
positive feedback and thus generate branching patterns of historical development’
(2004: 20–21). What this means in practical terms for the task in hand is that
even after common Third Way reform agendas have been implemented, the
distinct institutional patterns identified in the two countries – the different
‘branches’ of development – ought to remain intact: the UK ought to remain
a recognisable instance of a liberal regime with Beveridgian institutions and
Germany a conservative regime with Bismarckian institutions. As Pierson puts
it: ‘Change continues, but it is bounded change’ (2001: 415).
Once again, it is not difficult to construct a case that supports the perspective’s
claims. In terms of employment policy, while both have introduced active labour
market policies, the two nations’ unemployment protection systems still differ
radically along key dimensions: for instance, the German system still retains
the core features of the conservative/corporatist regime identified by Esping-
Andersen. While the perceived harshness of the Hartz reforms has produced
considerable political controversy, even at the end of the process the German
system remains resolutely different from that in the UK: the insurance principle
remains at the core of the system and the unemployed receive relatively generous
earnings-related benefits for a full 12 months (18 months for those over 55)
before they move on to the less generous social assistance rate. In the UK benefit
levels are low and there is little (in many cases no) difference between rates for
unemployment benefit and social assistance. Similarly, in terms of employment
protection and wage protection, the German system, despite Schro¨der’s reforms,
remains resolutely typical of a CME-based welfare production regime, given the
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strong role corporatist mechanisms such as works councils continue to play in
the labour market. By contrast, the UK’s LME approach is typified by its use of tax
credits – as opposed to collectively negotiated wage agreements – to supplement
low-level market wages and refusal to fully endorse EU limits on working hours.
In terms of pensions’ policy, while the Blair governments increased public
expenditure on the poorest pensioners quite significantly, the overall picture
of provision remains one in which state provision acts primarily as a safety
net, while private provision is encouraged for the majority. Indeed, it might
well be argued that reforms have solidified this picture given that increased
public resources have been primarily distributed through means-tested benefits,
while much policy attention has focused on extending private coverage through
stakeholder pensions and moves to shore up the security of private funds. The
German pension reforms, meanwhile, might well be seen in the same light as its
employment reforms: radical in terms of some of the principles they embrace,
but ultimately a tinkering at the margins. The introduction of a subsidised private
pension scheme is potentially radical and while take-up has risen since 2005 in
particular, its impact so far has been limited, not least because it is an addition
to the existing social insurance-based provision rather than a replacement of
it. Indeed, the core features of the conservative model – social insurance-based,
earnings-related pensions – remain at the heart of the German system. Much
the same can be argued with respect to health care reforms in the two countries
where, for all the hullabaloo surrounding Blair’s reforms, the core principles of
the NHS remain firmly intact and where Schro¨der has operated entirely within
the institutional structures he inherited.
In short, a more detached analysis that looks at where these reforms leave the
two countries, rather than the more immediate politics of the moment, suggests
that, for all the commonality in the ideas of Blair and Schro¨der, policy outcomes
have shown very strong signs of path dependency. It should be added, though,
that this is not to say that some reforms do not have the potential for greater
impact in the future and it may be that some mark the beginning of path-breaking
change processes rather than a completed reform agenda. Indeed, Pierson notes
that ‘policies that start small may, if conditions are right for self-reinforcement or
if unintended consequences are large, end up being extremely significant’ (2004:
166), and Streeck and Thelen argue that, in the long run, a series of seemingly small
institutional changes may result in ‘gradual transformation’ (2005: 9). Herein lies
one of the difficulties of applying the institutionalist analysis to contemporary
cases: in order to fully assess whether change is path breaking we need to look
forward as well as back, but this is impossible when analysing contemporary
events. Indeed, while we have suggested here that change has been largely path
confirming, it is worth noting that others have drawn different conclusions.
For instance, Schmidt described the German pension reforms as marking a
‘great path-deviation’ (2003: 247), while Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein (2006)
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believe German labour market policy has switched path to a liberal model heavily
influenced by the UK’s approach. This need for foresight in order to draw firm
conclusions is evidently a problem for the perspective, but it should not be
overplayed; if it means in practice that conclusions must remain provisional,
then the situation differs little from that we find in branches of the social science
with more clearly predictive aspirations. Here, our conclusions do indeed remain
provisional and, as changes play out, those calling the changes path breaking may –
or may not – prove to be more accurate in their judgement.
What we can say with greater certainty, however, is that a focus on
institutionalised policy legacies can help us to understand why the common
Third Way agenda has manifested itself in such different forms. For instance, the
huge political controversy surrounding the creation of foundation hospitals in
the UK would be difficult to understand from a German perspective, where the
initial extension of state involvement in health care did not manifest itself as a
nationalisation of health care provision and so, consequently, (state) ownership
of hospitals has never been a major political issue. Likewise, the enormous
trade union-driven demonstrations against the merger of social assistance and
unemployment insurance in Germany – a reform whose controversy exceeded
that of foundation hospitals in the UK – are difficult to understand from a British
perspective, where the differences in payment rates between the two benefit
categories have at most been minimal and, further, the trade unions have not
seen unemployment insurance as part of the employment package it is their role to
protect. In both instances, ostensibly common values cannot be easily translated
into common policies, or common policy ends, because the political debates
in the two nations are fundamentally shaped by past policies: institutionalised
legacies clearly generated policy feedback that reverberated through the two
nations’ Third Way narratives.
Between ideas and institutions
In short, the evidence presented here suggests that there are identifiable and
common Third Way elements in the Blair and Schro¨der welfare state reforms; as
such, we find support for Bevir and Rhodes’ insistence that a focus on narratives
and traditions can help us to understand the nature of policy change. Many
commentators remain sceptical of the very notion of a Third Way, but there
is a ring of truth to Bevir and Rhodes’ claim that ‘what matters . . . are the
subjective, or more usually, inter-subjective understandings of political actors,
not our academic accounts of real pressures in the world’ (2003: 36). However, the
interpretative approach only takes us so far. Despite the commonalities, we found
much difference in policy detail, both in terms of policy direction and destination.
While ideas and beliefs – the responses to dilemmas that threaten traditions if
you like – are evidently a force for change, ideas are fuzzy. The two nations’
different starting points – their institutionalised policy legacies – fundamentally
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shaped the way in which beliefs about changed circumstances were interpreted
into actual policy measures. In short, just as ideas hold the potential to reshape
institutions, so too ideas are influenced by institutions.
Significantly, a careful reading of the literature shows that the two approaches
share many core arguments and, in truth, would benefit from a fusion of their
ideas rather than being presented as oppositional tendencies. In their keenness
to mark new intellectual territory with their interpretative approach, Bevir and
Rhodes have thrown the baby out with the bathwater. Indeed, it might well be
argued that their attack on historical institutionalism is somewhat odd: while it is
fair to say that the influence of ideas on policy change has not been systematically
teased out by institutionalists keen to emphasise the stability of policy and politics
(see Be´land, 2005), the approach has always been receptive to ideationally based
arguments (for example, Hall, 1992). Moreover, institutionalists are aware that
their perspective faces some difficulty in explaining change, and greater analysis
of the role of ideas in propelling change is commonly advocated (see Streeck
and Thelen, 2005). The interpretative approach’s focus on established traditions,
dilemmas and narratives might well help here.
Indeed, in focusing on traditions on the one hand and path dependency on
the other, the two perspectives share a fundamental view that history matters a
great deal. Bevir and Rhodes’ notion of ‘tradition’ overlaps strongly with that of
positive feedback: both, in essence, encapsulate the claim that past approaches
heavily frame present thinking. Pierson says as much when he argues that ‘actors
who operate in a social context of high complexity and opacity are heavily biased
in the way they feed the information into existing “mental maps”. Confirming
information tends to be incorporated, while disconfirming information is filtered
out’ (2004: 35). As he puts it, this means that ‘social interpretations of complex
environments like politics are often subject to positive feedback . . . the need to
employ mental maps induces positive feedback’ (ibid.). It is only a small leap from
this view to Bevir and Rhodes’ claim that actors respond to pressures for change –
dilemmas – from within long-held traditions. Likewise, Bevir and Rhodes’ focus
on the role of dilemmas in forcing the augmentation of traditions does not sit
uneasily with the institutionalists’ view of path dependency as a scenario where
‘change continues, but it is bounded change – until something erodes or swamps
the mechanisms of reproduction that generated continuity’ (Pierson, 2004: 52).
While the language used in the two schools of thought differs slightly – crisis and
dilemma, equilibrium and tradition – the overall thrust of the argument is, in
truth, broadly similar.
In short, when Bevir and Rhodes argue ‘the point at issue is whether we
can read off the beliefs, desires and actions of individuals from their institutional
locations’ (2003: 63), they are undoubtedly correct in their claims about the
complexities of human motivation, but are wrong in their belief that this
is the key issue – their claim here rests on a mistaken interpretation of the
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TABLE 4. The Theoretical perspectives compared
Perspective predicts: Strengths of approach: Weaknesses of approach:
Interpretative approach
(Ideational)
Third Way policy narratives explain actions
in both nations
Third Way narrative can be used to explain
reform agendas
Third Way narrative cannot explain diverging
policy trajectories and outcomes
Cannot ‘read off’ policy detail from
ideas – context matters
Varieties of capitalism
(Employment policy
institutions)
Germany should pursue a more corporatist
approach
Captures overall nature of differences at end of
reform processes well:
Instances of reform running counter to
principles:
UK should pursue a more market-based
approach
• Ger: relatively generous, earnings-related
unemployment benefits and strong
corporatism;
• Ger: Hartz reforms, modest loosening of
employment protections;
• UK: relatively low, flat-rate unemployment
benefits, central role of tax credits
• UK: considerable increase in public
expenditure, minimum wage,
endorsement of EU Social Chapter
Welfare regimes
(Pensions
institutions)
Earnings-related social insurance should
predominate in Germany
Captures overall nature of differences at the end
of reform processes well:
Instances of reform running counter to
principles:
Minimal flat-rate and means-tested benefits
should predominate in the UK
• Ger: relatively generous, earnings-related
pensions, tentative encouragement of private
pension provision;
• Ger: introduction of voluntary private
pensions and means-tested basic security
for poorest;
• UK: increased targeting on poorest
pensioners, private provision encouraged
• UK: spending and generosity of state
pensions increased slightly
Beveridge v Bismarck
(Health institutions)
Stratified health insurance-based
entitlements and parastatal delivery should
continue to characterise German system
Captures overall nature of differences at the end
of reform processes well:
Instances of reform running counter to
principles:
Universal and general tax funded
entitlements and state administered
delivery should continue to characterise
the UK
• Ger: social insurance, entitlement-based,
earnings-related benefits organised in
numerous health insurances funds;
• Ger: Increased co-payments to contain
health care costs; tentative increases of
monitoring and nationwide efficiency
measures;• UK: tax funded, flat-rate and universal health
care administered predominantly by the state • UK: considerable increase of health
spending, increased devolution
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institutionalist position. Far from occupying separate intellectual spaces, we
suggest that combining elements of the interpretive approach with those of
historical institutionalism offers a fruitful line of analysis in understanding a
more subtle question: that of how the interaction between ideas and institutions
impacts on policy outcomes.
From cross-national to cross-sector: policy networks and power
dependency
So far, analysis has proceeded on the basis that two cases have been presented –
Germany and the UK – when in fact we have six: three policy sectors in the two
different countries. One of the weaknesses in much of the theoretical comparative
welfare states literature is that it presents broad typologies that underplay national
cross-sectoral variations, and certainly this is an issue here: while we have argued
that strong path-dependent tendencies are at play, the ‘institutionalised legacies’
we presented were applied to each sector rather than the welfare state as a whole.
In many ways, this runs counter to the ambitions of those who developed the
typologies: certainly, Esping-Andersen’s regimes are supposed to be applicable to
the whole of a nation’s welfare regime. Yet Levi-Faur has vehemently argued that
‘Nations and sectors are an important source of political variations and some
marked advantages accrue from studying them together in the same research
design’ (2006: 368, emphasis added). Ironically, much of Rhodes’ earlier work on
policy networks forcefully argued the need to focus on the sectoral-level dynamics
of the policy process (for example, Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a; Rhodes, 1997).
Indeed, the key insight of this earlier work was that sectoral-level policy networks
matter because national governments must negotiate reform programmes with
policy networks of varying degrees of power and autonomy: in short, the varying
resources of networks affect the state’s dependency on others and so its own
power in each policy sector.
However, Rhodes’ shift to an interpretive approach leaves something of a
question mark over the status of his earlier work on policy networks. On the one
hand, Bevir and Rhodes insist that ‘policy networks are a long-standing feature
of British government . . . the defining characteristic of governance’ (2003: 55).
Consequently, they urge us to ‘decentre’ our analysis for ‘any straightforward
comparison of national traditions runs the danger of ignoring significant
complexity and diversity’ (ibid: 98). On the other hand, they suggest dominant
conceptions of policy networks (including Rhodes’ earlier work) are ‘positivistic’
in outlook because of their focus on power dependence and measuring the
size and independence of networks. They argue that, from an interpretive
perspective, ‘a decentred account of governance would not stress their allegedly
objective characteristics. Rather it would focus on the social construction of
policy networks through the ability of individuals to create meaning’ (ibid: 62).
In advocating such an absolute rejection of a structurally rooted analysis, Rhodes
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performs a considerable u-turn, for he had earlier looked to associate the policy
network approach with institutional analysis, arguing ‘policy network theories
adopt a “state-centric” approach to public policy making, studying “behaviour
within institutional contexts”’ and that, consequently, ‘policy networks is an
institutionalist approach’ (1995: 53).
Yet if we examine the cases presented here at the sectoral rather than
national level, Rhodes’ earlier arguments continue to carry much force. What is
particularly notable is that the most radical reforms – and those that are most
clearly ‘Third Way’ – are found in the employment policy sector, where the policy
networks are at their weakest. This is particularly so in the UK, where the absence
of any powerful organisation to represent the interests of benefit claimants made
the passage of ALMP a relatively straightforward task for the Blair government.
In Germany, the corporatist institutions and wider reach of benefits made change
more difficult, but, ultimately, delaying the pace of reform rather than vetoing
it. By way of contrast, in health care – the classic example of a well-organised
and resourced policy community – change in Germany was minimal and reform
in the UK has been accompanied by a huge injection of funding to placate the
policy community. Moreover, it is in this sector that it is hardest to identify a
common Third Way approach across the two countries, with widely diverging
reform strategies being adopted. That a governing ‘ideology’ should have greatest
and clearest impact where networks are weakest (and vice versa) is unsurprising:
Rhodes’ earlier review of the progress of Thatcherite reforms in the UK drew
broadly similar conclusions (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992b).
Significantly, the analytic power of the policy network approach in these cases
stems precisely from its focus on sectoral-level power–dependency relationships.
The contrast between relatively weak and relatively strong policy networks offers
us a convincing explanation for the varying progress of Third Way reforms across
policy sectors and, while an analysis of the traditions and narratives at play in
these sectors would, no doubt, deepen our understanding of the dynamics of
policy change in these sectors, such a claim does not need to undermine the
value of the power–dependency approach. Indeed, it might well be argued that
significant elements of sectoral-level traditions can be understood by reference to
institutionalised policy legacies at this level. While the health care sector displays
the most autonomy in both countries, the significance of specific policy issues in
the two nations is, as we have shown, fundamentally influenced by the shape and
form of existing policies and institutions, and, consequently, there are some major
differences in the policy outcomes members of the network have advocated.
Once again, it might well be argued that Bevir and Rhodes have constructed
something of a straw person in their (re-)conceptualisation of the policy network
approach. Far from being rooted in a ‘positivist’ mindset that emphasises
measurement of the ‘objective characteristics’ of networks, most of the literature
is rooted in a qualitative, discursive, case-study-based tradition (Hudson and
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Lowe, 2004) and recent work by Marsh and Smith (2000), for instance, could
hardly be described as ‘positivist’, given its emphasis on the complex, continuous
and unpredictable interaction between network structures, agents and context.
Constructing such a figure allows them to place much clearer water between their
interpretive approach and the dominant claims made by policy networks theorists
than is warranted; indeed, much is to be gained from fusing their focus on ideas
and narratives with both the institutionalist emphasis on path dependency and
the policy network approach’s emphasis on power dependency.
Conclusion
Bevir and Rhodes’ assertion that policy analysts need to pay greater attention
to the ideas propounded by policy actors themselves rather than looking to
privilege academic accounts of change carries much truth. While commentators
have legitimately challenged the intellectual coherence of the Third Way, what
ultimately matters here is whether – as a narrative conceived in response to the
dilemmas facing social democratic traditions – it can help to explain the nature
and form of actual social policy reforms. To a large degree it can, for the narrative
outlined by Blair and Schro¨der in the early days of their administrations chimes
well with much of their actual welfare state reform agendas. Indeed, we believe
that ‘Third Way thinking’ has had an important impact on social policy in the
two countries.
However, Bevir and Rhodes are wrong to claim that a focus on narratives
can explain everything. In examining two nations with an ostensibly common
reform agenda, we have shown not only that the precise nature of the Third Way
agenda has differed considerably in some key areas, but that institutionalised
policy legacies help explain differences in the agenda between the countries and
that varying policy networks help us to understand differences between sectors
within countries. While Bevir and Rhodes rightly challenge a tendency among
policy analysts to dismiss (and simplify) policy actors’ views in favour of academic
accounts of change, it is ironic that, in seeking to articulate a clear and distinct
interpretive approach to political science, they have often been guilty of similarly
dismissing and simplifying the views of other policy analysts. Rather than looking
to stress the difference by adopting an extreme position or by picking fights with
historical institutionalists and policy network theorists, Bevir and Rhodes would
do more to advance serious discussion of the impact of ideas on policy change by
looking for potential synergies between their work and these perspectives – they
are better viewed as complementary perspectives rather than competing ones.
While comparative exploration of common Third Way agendas can
demonstrate the value of examining ideas as an explanation for change, it also
demonstrates the weaknesses of an approach based on ideas alone. It has often
been argued that the nature of the Third Way is best determined by examination
of policy detail rather than through statements of broad intent. This seems to
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make sense, but only if we overlook two basic facts. The first is that in looking to
assess the impact of a common idea in two countries, different starting points –
policy legacies – make it difficult to determine analytically what might constitute
divergent or convergent policy agendas: indeed, difference is inevitable, for path-
dependent tendencies will exert their influence on national debates. The second
is that policy, as a decentred approach implies, is not made in a vacuum; it
is shaped by outside interests too. Deviation from a core set of ideas held by
central actors again appears inevitable, therefore, and strong variations are likely
to exist across sectors. In other words, ideas can only ever give us part of the
picture. As Richardson argues, in practice ‘ideas, institutions and interests become
entwined’ (2000: 1019). There is much merit, therefore, in adopting a multi-
theoretic approach that encourages analysis of all three together. In practice, of
course, many other factors – particularly macro-level forces such as demographic
and economic change – heavily influence policy change, not least through their
impact on policy ideas or narratives: space precludes a discussion here of the
interaction between macro- and meso-level forces (see Hudson and Lowe, 2004).
Our suggestion here is merely that, as a meso-level approach, ideational analysis
has considerable value, but only if it is paired with a consideration of the
institutions and policy networks that frame ideas in each specific policy arena.
Skocpol and Amenta famously argued that ‘not only does politics create
social policies; social policies also create politics’ (1986: 149). We might also add
that not only do ideas create social policies, but social policies also create ideas.
Indeed, in the cases we have examined here it seems that, if anything, such is
the level of policy feedback that social policy has often had the upper hand
in this relationship. This, of course, creates very difficult analytic problems for
those exploring Third Way agendas, for it means policy convergence – even at the
national level – is unlikely to be particularly deep other than at the rhetorical level.
And if divergence of policy trajectories is all but inevitable given the fundamental
role of institutional legacies and policy networks in shaping policy outcomes,
then how are we to tell if Giddens’ ‘Global Third Way’ was a movement of real
substance or nothing more than empty rhetoric? The answer is that in order to be
fair to the Third Way, rather than simply dismissing it as irrelevant dressing, we
need to examine not just the ideas held by policy actors but also their interaction
with these other factors. The search for the essence of a Third Way in practice
will otherwise be fruitless, for it lies between ideas, institutions and interests.
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